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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. Scott Pruitt, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of Oklahoma,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as
)
Secretary of the United States Department of Health
)
and Human Services; and TIMOTHY GEITHNER,
)
in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States )
Department of the Treasury,
)
)
Defendants.
)
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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision, 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A, as part of a comprehensive reform to address a crisis in the interstate health care
market. When the provision becomes effective in 2014, it will require individuals who are not
otherwise exempt to obtain qualifying coverage, or to pay a tax penalty with their income tax
returns. Section 5000A, however, applies only to individuals. It imposes no obligations on
states; it does not require a state government to take any action, or to forbear from any action.
The State of Oklahoma nonetheless asserts that it has standing to challenge the validity of
Section 5000A, in lieu of a suit brought by an individual affected by the provision. But as
Oklahoma itself recognizes, standing requirements exist because the “decision to seek review
must be placed ‘in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.’” Pl.’s Mem. in
Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ECF No. 23 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740
(1972)). Those individuals who are concretely affected by the minimum coverage provision
would have that direct stake; the State of Oklahoma does not. Because federal courts lack “the
power to invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with them,” Ariz. Christian Sch.
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011), Oklahoma’s complaint should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
I.

Oklahoma Cannot Sue the Federal Government to Exempt Its Citizens from
Federal Law
Oklahoma correctly acknowledges that it lacks standing to bring a suit seeking to exempt

its citizens from the operation of federal law. (Pl.’s Mem. at 4.) It is black-letter law that a
“State does not have standing as a parens patriae to bring an action on behalf of its citizens
against the federal government because the federal government is presumed to represent the

1
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State’s citizens.” Wyoming v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 883 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). Despite its disavowal, Oklahoma seeks precisely the
result that Mellon forbids. It asks the Court to declare that Section 5000A may not validly be
applied, and to enjoin federal officers from enforcing it. Compl. at 7, ECF No. 2 (prayer for
relief). In other words, Oklahoma seeks “to protect her citizens from the operation of federal
statutes.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007). Because established precedent
“prohibits” this result, id., Oklahoma lacks standing.
II.

The Mere Existence of a State Law Does Not Vest a State with Standing to
Challenge Federal Law
Oklahoma attempts to avoid the prohibition against parens patriae suits against the

federal government, by claiming that its suit seeks instead to resolve an alleged conflict between
26 U.S.C. § 5000A and the recent amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution, OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 37(B)(1). Oklahoma asserts that “‘the mere existence of the lawfully-enacted statute is
sufficient’” to give the state standing to explore in federal court whether the state law conflicts
with the federal law, and, if so, which law should control. (Pl.’s Mem. at 15, quoting Virginia v.
Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605-06 (E.D. Va. 2010), appeals pending, Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058
(4th Cir.).) This reasoning is incorrect. The simple existence of a state law that might conflict
with federal law does not, by itself, create a case or controversy that a federal court may decide.
The Supreme Court emphasized this point in holding that a state may not challenge the
constitutionality of a federal law in the abstract, without a showing that the state itself had
suffered a concrete injury from the operation of the federal statute. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 484.
The Court recognized that the federal courts “have no right to pronounce an abstract opinion
upon the constitutionality” of a state or federal law. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Instead,
“[i]t is only where the rights of persons or property are involved, and when such rights can be

2
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presented under some judicial form of proceedings, that courts of justice can interpose relief. . . .
Such law must be brought into actual, or threatened operation upon rights properly falling under
judicial cognizance, or a remedy is not to be had here.” Id. Mellon did not announce any new
principles when it drew this distinction. Rather, it “relied on the long-established doctrine that
general interests in sovereignty – that is, in making and applying law to the exclusion of another
government – were not justiciable.” Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81
VA. L. REV. 387, 491 n.416 (1995).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that a state may not ask a federal court to
decide “an abstract question of legislative power,” in the absence of a concrete controversy.
Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 162 (1922); see also United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463,
473-74 (1935); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 337 (1926).

Oklahoma attempts to

distinguish these cases on the ground that they did not involve allegations that state law had been
pre-empted, and so there was “no allegation of direct injury to the State” from the challenged
federal law. (Pl.’s Mem. at 23.) Oklahoma is absolutely incorrect in its characterization of these
cases. Each of these cases involved allegations that state law and federal law were in conflict.
And in each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that such an allegation, without more, stated
only an “abstract” dispute that a federal court could not resolve.
In Texas v. ICC, for example, the state’s complaint was “of unusual length” (Pl.’s Mem.
at 23) because it recited in detail a number of state constitutional provisions and state statutes
that Texas alleged were in direct conflict with the federal Transportation Act of 1920. Texas
recited, for example, that it “ha[d] passed and made effective a code of laws governing the
issuance of stock, bonds and securities by railroad corporations,” and that Congress had
infringed upon the state’s “code of laws” by enacting a statute that regulated the issuance of

3
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those securities on different terms. Original Bill in Equity at 29-30, Texas v. ICC, No. 24
Original (U.S. filed June 6, 1921) (Ex. 1). See also id. at 25, 32, 52, 53, 53-54, 63-64 (alleging
direct conflicts between state statutes and various provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920).
The Supreme Court recognized that the allegation of conflicts between the state statutes
and the federal law, standing alone, amounted only to “the presentation of an abstract question of
legislative power,” which “does not present a case or controversy within the range of the judicial
power as defined by the Constitution.” Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. at 162. The Court emphasized
that state law and federal law must actually be applied in conflict with each other before a case or
controversy will arise; it is not enough simply to assert that the two laws conflict in the abstract.
“It is only where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of judicial cognizance, are being, or
about to be, affected prejudicially by the application or enforcement of a statute that its validity
may be called in question by a suitor and determined by an exertion of the judicial power.” Id.
(citing, e.g., Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 73 (1867)).
Oklahoma likewise errs in claiming that New Jersey v. Sargent did not involve an
assertion of a “direct conflict” between state and federal law. (Pl.’s Mem. at 21.) The state did
indeed allege such a conflict, explicitly and unequivocally, but the Supreme Court held that the
allegation alone did not present a concrete case or controversy. The state recited a number of its
state statutes that regulated the use of its waterways, and it claimed standing because it “ha[d] by
law provided for the exercise of its right, power, and authority” over the state’s waters, and
because its statutes controlled over any contrary terms of the Federal Power Act. Original Bill in
Equity at 29, New Jersey v. Sargent, No. 20 Original (U.S. filed Nov. 21, 1923) (Ex. 2).
The Supreme Court recognized that New Jersey had alleged that the Federal Power Act
“will jeopardize its policy respecting the conservation of potable waters.” Sargent, 269 U.S. at

4
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338. It nonetheless held that the issue was only “an abstract question respecting the relative
authority of Congress and the state in dealing with such waters,” not a cognizable case or
controversy. Id. at 330. “Plainly these allegations do not suffice as a basis for invoking an
exercise of judicial power.” Id. at 337. New Jersey lacked standing because “[t]here is no
showing that the state is now engaged or about to engage in any work or operations which the act
purports to prohibit or restrict, or that the defendants are interfering or about to interfere with any
work or operations in which the state is engaged.” Id. at 338.
Oklahoma similarly errs in its characterization of United States v. West Virginia, which it
describes as not involving any claim of “interference” by the state with the interests of the United
States. (Pl.’s Mem. at 20.) In that case, the United States sought to invoke the Court’s original
jurisdiction. It claimed that a live controversy existed with West Virginia because the state had
enacted statutes that “declared its right of control over the development of electric power on its
rivers,” and that “[t]hese legislative Acts” had “produced an indivisible injury to the United
States” in that the state denied that the Federal Power Act would control over contrary state law.
Plaintiff’s Brief in Reply at 20, United States v. West Virginia, No. 17 Original (U.S. filed Apr.
27, 1935) (Ex. 3). The Court recognized that the state had asserted “a right superior to that of the
United States to license the use” of its rivers, and that the state “denie[d] the right” of the federal
government to regulate its water under the Federal Power Act, insofar as the federal statute was
“an invasion of the sovereign rights of the state.” West Virginia, 295 U.S. at 469.
Despite these allegations, the Court held that there was no live controversy between the
United States and West Virginia, even though there was a live controversy between the United
States and a private corporation, which had claimed a privilege under the state statutes to build a
dam on waters that the federal government claimed the right to regulate. Because “the bill

5
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allege[d] no act or threat of interference by the state” with the exercise of federal authority, id. at
472, the complaint alleged only “a difference of opinion between the officials of the two
governments,” id. at 473. Such a difference of opinion – even a difference of opinion as to
whether a state statute or a federal statute is controlling – did not state a concrete controversy.
Instead, “[u]ntil the right asserted is threatened with invasion by acts of the state, which serve
both to define the controversy and to establish its existence in the judicial sense, there is no
question presented which is justiciable by a federal court.” Id. at 474 (citations omitted). In
other words, “rival claims of sovereign power made by the national and a state government,”
standing alone, could not create a case or controversy in the absence of direct actions by the state
or federal governments in conflict with each other. Id. at 475.
Oklahoma stands in the same position as the states in these cases. Like Texas, New
Jersey, and West Virginia, it alleges only that it has enacted a provision of state law that it claims
is in conflict with federal law. Even if such a conflict exists – and it is far from certain that the
Oklahoma constitutional amendment could ever actually be applied in a manner in conflict with
federal law – this bare allegation presents only an “abstract question” that is not within the power
of the federal courts to decide. If the rule were otherwise, Oklahoma could challenge any federal
law it wished as inconsistent with other declarations of rights in its Constitution, such as the
state’s Due Process Clause, OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7, or its guarantee of the inherent rights of
citizens, id. art. II, § 2. Any policy dispute could thereby be imported into the judicial arena.
III.

Oklahoma Has Alleged No Cognizable Injury to Its Own Interests as a State
As discussed above, a state may not establish its standing to pursue a claim in federal

court simply by alleging that state law and federal law are in conflict. At a minimum, a state
must instead allege some direct injury to its own activities, as a state government, to allege an

6
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injury that is cognizable in federal court. For example, a state may challenge a federal measure
that commands the state government to take action, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), or that prohibits specified action of the state government, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970).

Section 5000A, however, places no constraints on the Oklahoma state

government. The State of Oklahoma, then, suffers no injury from the provision distinct from the
purported injury that it claims is suffered by state residents.
The cases that Oklahoma relies upon in its opposition memorandum confirm this
principle. Those cases did not find that a state established standing merely by alleging a conflict
between state and federal law; instead, the state had standing to challenge interference with
enforcement activities that the state government had undertaken, or planned to undertake. In
Maine v. Taylor, for example, the state had standing to pursue an appeal of a judgment that had
declared its state statute unconstitutional, because a state “has a legitimate interest in the
continued enforceability of its own statutes,” 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986), and that interest was
threatened because Maine otherwise would have been bound by the lower court’s determination
that the statute was unconstitutional, id. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit held that the State of
Wyoming had standing under the APA to challenge a federal agency’s interpretation of the
federal Gun Control Act, based on the court’s conclusion that the agency’s interpretation would
affect how the state enforced its own regulation of permits to carry concealed weapons. The
Tenth Circuit thus concluded that the federal agency “interfere[d] with Wyoming’s ability to
enforce its legal code” with respect to Wyoming residents who applied for such permits.
Wyoming v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008), and that Congress had
conferred standing on the state insofar as the Gun Control Act “grants states significant latitude
to determine the applicability of the Act by relying on state law, in part, to determine the classes

7
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of individuals who may not possess a firearm,” id. at 1243.
In contrast, Oklahoma does not allege that it intends to engage in any regulatory
activities, as a state government, with respect to its constitutional amendment, nor does it seek to
assert any rights under the Affordable Care Act. The amendment does no more than declare
rights under state law. It does not grant the state government any enforcement powers, or
establish any regulatory system. Oklahoma thus lacks standing, because, although a state may
have standing to “complain about the curtailment of its statutory powers,” it may do so only if
federal action actually interferes with “statutory authority exercised” by the state. Illinois Dep’t
of Transp. v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1997).
Oklahoma, in apparent recognition of this defect in its standing allegations, argues that
the state constitutional amendment is “enforceable under the general provisions of the civil
laws.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 16.) Oklahoma carefully avoids describing who might enforce the
provision, or against whom the provision is enforceable. For the reasons discussed above, it
would not suffice to claim that private parties might seek to enforce any rights provided under
the provision; at a minimum, a state must allege that its own actions as a state government have
been interfered with in order to establish standing. Oklahoma does not allege that it, as a state
government, could enforce the terms of the constitutional amendment against private parties.
The amendment by its own terms applies only to “law[s] or rule[s],” and only to those laws or
rules that have been brought into effect after January 1, 2010, making it apparent that the
provision applies to the Affordable Care Act alone. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 37(B)(1). But in any
event, nothing in Section 5000A would prevent Oklahoma from enforcing a similar provision
against private parties. Section 5000A applies only to individuals, and bars no state actor from
doing anything. If Oklahoma wishes to prohibit its own state officials, or private actors within

8
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the state, from imposing additional insurance requirements, it is free to do so.
Oklahoma’s unarticulated claim, then, must be that it has enforcement power under the
state constitutional amendment to restrain the federal government from implementing Section
5000A. Oklahoma cites Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, for the proposition that it
has an interest, with respect to suits by the state against private parties, in the “exercise of
sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves
the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal.” 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
But it does not follow that Oklahoma has the same “sovereign interest” to bring suit under its
state laws against the United States. The United States is not an “individual[]” or “entit[y]” over
whom Oklahoma has “sovereign power.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 10.) See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 429 (1819) (“The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own
authority, or is introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are
employed by congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the
United States? We think it demonstrable, that it does not.”). This is not a statute that Oklahoma
can “enforce.” Because Oklahoma suffers no cognizable injury from its assertion that its state
law and the federal law are in conflict, it lacks standing to bring this suit.
Oklahoma also asserts that it has standing because it is “working in conjunction with” the
federal government to establish health insurance exchanges. (Pl.’s Mem. at 18.) It argues that, if
it succeeds in this lawsuit and Section 5000A is invalidated, the health insurance market “will
implode,” and no buyers will come to the exchanges that it will establish. (Pl.’s Mem. at 19.)
Oklahoma accordingly reasons that it has standing to seek to invalidate Section 5000A to achieve
this result. This argument is baseless. A plaintiff may not claim that it has standing because it
would be harmed by the relief that the plaintiff itself seeks. Instead, a core principle of standing

9
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is that a plaintiff must show that its claimed injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant and that those injuries would be redressed if the plaintiff were to prevail. E.g.,
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). That Oklahoma seeks, in pursuing
this lawsuit, to cause injury to its own voluntary efforts to establish a health insurance exchange
does not help its claim for standing. See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976)
(“No State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.”).1
In sum, Oklahoma lacks standing because, despite its disavowal of parens patriae
standing, its suit in fact seeks to exempt its citizens from the operation of federal law; Mellon
prohibits the state from seeking that relief. Oklahoma cannot avoid this result by citing an
alleged conflict between state and federal law, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly made
clear that such allegations of conflicting laws, standing alone, do not state a case or controversy
within the judicial power to decide. And, although in some circumstances a state may have
standing if federal law obstructs the state’s own enforcement activities, Oklahoma cannot
plausibly allege standing on these grounds because there are no enforcement activities to
obstruct. Section 5000A applies only to individuals, and does nothing whatsoever to limit the
actions of the Oklahoma state government.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

1

Oklahoma may mean to (but does not) argue that, because it may be affected by the
provision in the Affordable Care Act that offers grants to states to assist in establishing
exchanges, it has standing to challenge the separate provision of the Act enacting 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A. This does not follow. “Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he
seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734
(2008) (internal quotations omitted) (plaintiff must show standing under each separate provision
of federal law that it challenges).
10
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DATED this 26th day of April, 2011.
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